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Abstract
The theoretical literature has argued that a centralized wage bargaining system may 
result in low regional wage differentiation and high regional unemployment differenti-
als. The empirical literature has found that centralized wage bargaining leads to lower 
wage inequality for different skills, industries and population groups, but the evidence on 
its impact on regional wage differentiation is scant. Empirical evidence in this paper for 
European Union regions for the period 1980-2000 suggests that countries with more co-
ordinated wage bargaining systems have lower regional wage differentials, after contro-
lling for regional productivity and unemployment differentials. Estimates from wage cu-
rves for Germany and Italy based on panels of regions also suggest some links between 
the estimated elasticities and the level of coordination in wage bargaining.
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I Introduction
According to the theoretical literature, a centralized and coordinated wage bargaining 
system may cause low wage differentiation and high unemployment differentials acro-
ss different skill levels, population groups, industries and regions. Under such a system, 
wages across all groups will converge to the market equilibrium for the high productivity 
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group, or will be determined by the medium group. However, though the theoretical pre-
dictions are clear, empirical evidence is scant, especially for the effects on regional wage 
differentiation, with analysis hampered by data limitations at the regional level.
The issue is of particular interest for the EU. Average unemployment is higher in many 
of the European Union (EU) countries than in the rest of the industrial world. Some have 
argued that this is often a regional problem.1 Indeed, many EU countries have high regi-
onal unemployment differentials. Relatively low regional wage differentials in many EU 
countries suggest that regional wages do not adjust to equilibrate regional labor markets. 
Italy, for example, has the highest regional unemployment differentiation in the EU, but 
one of the lowest regional wage differentials.2 Unemployment in the South is almost four 
times higher than in the North, and while productivity in the South is only 80 percent of 
that in the North, wages are about 90 percent. Taking into account that the cost of living 
is most likely lower in the South, real wage differentiation between the two regions may 
be even lower than nominal wage differentiation. Italy’s centralized wage bargaining sy-
stem may be one of the reasons for its low wage differentiation across regions, which 
could partly explain its high regional unemployment imbalances.
This paper argues that coordinated wage bargaining systems and low regional wage 
differentiation may be linked. Empirical evidence for regions in 10 EU countries for the 
period 1980-2000 suggests that countries with less coordinated wage bargaining systems 
have higher regional wage differentials after controlling for regional productivity and 
unemployment differentials. The results are robust to estimation with instrumental va-
riables, suggesting that the causality runs from the wage bargaining system to regional 
wage differentiation. Moreover, the results turn out to hold only for countries with high 
regional productivity differentials. Therefore, the empirical evidence suggests that a more 
flexible wage bargaining system could increase regional wage differentiation, reflecting 
regional productivity differentials. Furthermore, results from wage curves estimated for 
panels of regions in Germany and Italy suggest some links between the estimated elasti-
cities and the level of coordination in wage bargaining. The paper proceeds as follows: 
section II discusses the previous literature; section III proceeds with the empirical evi-
dence; and Section IV concludes.
II Previous Literature 
The literature on the costs and benefits of various wage bargaining systems has pri-
marily focused on the impact of each system on total unemployment and inflation. Bruno 
and Sachs (1985) found that centralized wage bargaining systems result in lower unem-
ployment. Calmfors and Driffil (1988), Flanagan, Moene and Wallerstein (1993), and Cu-
kierman and Lippi (1999) found that centralized or very decentralized (firm level) bar-
gaining systems result in lower unemployment and lower wages, while intermediate sy-
stems, with negotiation at the industry level, result in higher unemployment and higher 
1 Pench, Sestito, and Frontini (1999) find that unemployment in Germany, Belgium, and Italy is primarily a 
regional problem.
2 For a discussion of the Italian wage bargaining structure see Demekas (1995), Erickson and Ichino (1995), 
Vamvakidis (2002), and Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2005). 
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wages. According to this evidence, extremes work better – a centralized bargaining sy-
stem leads to lower wage demands to internalize unemployment externalities, while a de-
centralized bargaining system leads to the same outcome because of high competition at 
the firm level. Both factors are absent when negotiations are at the industry level, as in-
dustry unions do not internalize the externality of their wage demands to the rest of the 
economy and competition is low across industries. However, this evidence is not robust 
as the review of the literature in OECD (1997 and 2006), Flanagan (1999) and Aidt and 
Tzannatos (2002) has shown, and the debate is still open. 
It has been argued that centralized and coordinated wage bargaining tends to reduce 
wage dispersion. In a coordinated wage bargaining system, in which wages are negoti-
ated at the national level, unions may tend to favor the median voter. Uncertainty about 
how wages will evolve after the negotiations could result in the compression of wage di-
fferentials by unions. Pench, Sestito, and Frontini (1999) present a model and some em-
pirical evidence for EU countries suggesting that in countries with centralized labor mar-
kets and large interregional productivity differentials decisions are tailored for the medi-
an region, resulting in a wage floor consistent with high unemployment in the less pro-
ductive regions. Furthermore, unions may show solidarity and call for average producti-
vity to determine wages. 
If in addition to a centralized wage bargaining system a country has regional economic 
asymmetries, then it is in the interest of the union members in the more developed regions 
to have wages above equilibrium in the less developed regions. Saint-Paul (1997) argu-
ed that wages in Italy and Germany are determined by the leading regions, North in Italy 
and West in Germany, and that the union members in the leading regions have an incen-
tive to keep wage differentiation low to slow down migration flows.3 Brunello, Lupi, and 
Ordine (2001) and Vamvakidis (2002) presented evidence for Italy suggesting that the 
wage in the South, the high unemployment region, is significantly affected by the unem-
ployment rate in the North, the low unemployment region, while the unemployment rate 
in the South does not have a statistically significant impact. 
The parties with decision power in a centralized wage bargaining system may prefer 
a low regional wage differentiation. Workers and employers in the leading regions may 
feel threatened from low wages in the lagging region, while the employed in the lagging 
regions prefer high wages. On the other hand, employers in the leading regions would 
prefer lower wages in the lagging regions if this would also keep wages in the leading 
regions down. However, the latter would require high regional factor mobility, which is 
not always the case in Europe. The groups who would benefit from higher regional wage 
differentiation include the group of unemployed in the lagging regions, who, however, 
do not have a bargaining power, and the employers in the lagging regions, who, althou-
gh may participate in the decision process, may be less powerful than the employers in 
the leading regions.
In a country with a centralized and coordinated wage bargaining system and with 
wages determined by the leading region, low wage dispersion could coexist with high 
3 Although Decressin and Decressin (2002) found no compelling evidence for wage floors that constrain the 
adjustment of wages of the less well paid in Germany.
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unemployment variation. A negative economic shock will increase unemployment in the 
lagging region without affecting wages, while the same shock in the leading region will 
reduce wages. As a result, the impact of a negative shock on employment will be smaller 
in the leading region and will not last as long as in the lagging region. If local wages were 
determined by local economic conditions, then temporary asymmetric economic shocks 
would not cause permanent regional unemployment disparities.4 Empirical evidence su-
pport this argument, finding negative shocks in a centralized wage bargaining system to 
have a larger impact on poor regions (see Pench, Sestito, and Frontini, 1999). Thomas 
(2002) finds similar evidence at the industry level. 
The empirical literature on wage bargaining systems reviewed in OECD (1997, 2004 
and 2006) finds a strong link between higher centralization and coordination of wage bar-
gaining and lower earnings inequality for different skill levels and wage dispersion acro-
ss different industries, but also across different population groups, such as for young or 
older workers and women. Furthermore, this seems to be the only robust result of this li-
terature (see Flanagan (1999) Aidt and Tzannatos (2002)).5 One would expect this result 
to hold for regional wage disparities as well.
The investigation for the links between local labor market conditions and wages has 
been primarily in the context of unionization. The literature has found that the elastici-
ty of wages with respect to regional unemployment depends on the presence and stren-
gth of labor unions (see Blanchflower and Oswald (1994)). Although this relationship is 
not always robust, evidence in Erling, Bratsberg, Naylor and Raaum (2002) for the USA, 
the U.K and Norway confirm that the response of wages to local unemployment is stron-
ger for nonunion workers (the relationship is not statistically significant for union wor-
kers). The authors argue that unionization is often linked to coordination and centraliza-
tion in wage negotiations, which suggests that the latter will also lead to a weak response 
of wages to local unemployment. 
III Empirical Evidence 
A Evidence from a panel of regions in EU countries
This section provides estimates of the links between the degree of coordination in the 
wage bargaining system and regional wage differentials in EU countries. As the previous 
section concluded, the literature has found strong empirical evidence that centralized and 
coordinated wage bargaining systems lead to low wage inequality across different skills, 
industries and population groups. Theoretical arguments suggest that the same result sho-
uld hold for regional wage differentials. 
Most EU countries have relatively high unemployment rates and low labor market 
participation rates (Table 1). Moreover, they have high regional unemployment variati-
4 See Brunello, Lupi and Ordine (2001). 
5 Dell’Aringa and Pagani (2007) find that in countries with relatively centralized wage bargaining systems (Italy, 
Belgium and Spain) wages of workers covered by only a multi-employer contract are no more compressed than those 
of workers covered by both multi-employer and single-employer contracts. This implies that where workers are not 
covered by single-employer bargaining, they receive wage supplements paid unilaterally by their employers.
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on (Table 2) – with Italy having the largest regional unemployment disparities in the EU. 
Although the regional mix of industries may contribute to this result, OECD (2000) finds 
a very low correlation between regional unemployment rates and the proportions of em-
ployment in agriculture, manufacturing, and services in OECD countries. 
The collective bargaining structure is usually assessed based on indices for the level 
of wage bargaining and the level of coordination among employers and trade unions. A 
wage bargaining system is characterized as centralized or decentralized, depending on the 
extent that wages are decided at the national level, or at the firm level respectively – ne-
gotiations at the industry or the sector level is the intermediate case. National level bar-
gaining does not necessarily result in a uniform wage, since it often includes negotiations 
for wages by sector, or region. A wage bargaining system is characterized as coordina-
ted if wage negotiations between unions, employers, and the government are coordinated,
either through national bargaining, or through other formal or informal mechanisms when 
Table 1  Unemployment and Participation Rates in Selected OECD Countries, 
1980-2007
Unemployment Rate Participation Rate
1980 1990 2000 2007 1980 1990 2000 2007
Euro area 4.9 7.2 7.9 6.8 65.1 65.7 69.1 71.9
Australia 6.1 6.6 6.3 4.3 70.6 74.4 75.1 77.8
Austria 1.4 4.1 4.6 5.3 79.9 78.1 79.7 79.1
Belgium 6.7 6.6 6.9 7.7 63.7 62.9 66.1 68.0
Canada 7.5 8.2 6.8 6.0 72.6 77.7 77.2 79.9
Germany 1.7 4.5 6.9 6.4 68.3 72.4 75.2 77.8
Denmark 5.2 7.2 4.3 3.5 80.7 82.3 81.1 83.0
Finland 4.6 4.6 9.8 6.6 75.2 76.7 74.5 75.4
France 5.6 7.7 8.1 8.0 67.2 65.0 68.3 68.5
Greece 2.8 7.0 11.7 8.6 56.9 60.2 63.0 65.6
Ireland 7.5 13.1 4.3 4.8 63.5 63.4 69.7 74.3
Italy 5.6 9.1 10.2 5.9 61.3 60.0 60.0 63.1
Netherlands 3.9 5.7 3.0 3.3 66.5 68.8 77.4 79.8
Norway 1.7 5.2 3.4 2.5 75.3 78.0 80.7 80.5
Portugal 8.3 4.8 4.0 7.9 68.9 72.1 75.1 78.2
Spain 9.3 12.1 10.8 8.1 58.7 59.0 64.9 73.2
Sweden 2.0 1.6 4.7 4.6 81.5 84.5 77.8 79.5
Switzerland 0.2 0.5 2.5 3.3 77.8 86.6 86.6 88.2
UK 6.8 7.1 5.5 5.5 74.6 77.4 75.7 76.2
United States 7.2 5.6 4.0 4.6 63.8 66.5 67.1 66.1
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook
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wage negotiations are taking place at the sector, regional, or firm level. The indices in 
Table 3 from OECD (1997; 2004) take values from 1 to 5, with 1 for the lowest level of 
centralization or coordination. Many European economies have centralized and highly 
coordinated collective bargaining systems, as well as high bargaining coverage and trade 
union density. The overall trend in the OECD countries is towards more decentralized 
wage bargaining systems, although at a slow pace (see OECD, 2004; 2006). 
In the analysis that follows, the degree of coordination is chosen as an indicator of 
the centralization of the wage bargaining system. The literature has argued that even in 
decentralized wage bargaining systems, the wage outcome will be the same as in centrali-
zed bargaining system when there is a high degree of coordination (see Flanagan (1999), 
OECD (2004), and Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel and Quintini (2003)). Even if wages are de-
termined at the firm or industry level, high coordination between unions, employers’ or-
ganizations and the government produces the same outcome as in a system of wage bar-
gaining at the national level (OECD, 1997). As noted by Flanagan (1999), “…(the) bar-
gaining level is then the form but not the substance of the bargaining system…empirical 
work stemming from the bargaining level literature misclassifies (as decentralized) those 
countries with company-level negotiations in which bargaining outcomes are in fact hi-
ghly coordinated across bargaining pairs…” and “given the many ambiguities in measu-
res of bargaining centralization,…measures of bargaining coordination seem preferable 
to measures of bargaining level.”
Table 2 EU Unemployment Rate (Regional Coefficient of Variation)
1990 1995 2000
EU 65.5 60.1 65.9
Belgium 43.8 41.1 57.8
Denmark 22.2 28.2 22.5
Germany 43.7 33.1 47.7
Greece 27.4 24.3 17.3
Spain 36.0 28.4 44.0
France 24.8 22.3 29.4
Ireland 12.9 11.8 23.2
Italy 70.8 63.9 75.3
Netherlands 26.9 19.3 33.2
Austria ... 36.0 33.8
Portugal 50.6 30.3 32.5
Finland 51.7 16.0 34.7
Sweden 41.1 17.8 31.8
UK 47.1 35.8 53.0
United States 25.5 (1993) 27.0 27.5
Source: Eurostat and U.S. Department of Labor
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The sample in what follows includes the regions of the following countries: Belgium, 
Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. The 
choice of the countries in the sample is based on data availability in the Regional Statisti-
cs of Eurostat (various issues up to 2004), which is the source for all data but the index of 
coordination of the wage bargaining system, which comes from OECD (1997 and 2004).6 
The definition of the regions follows Eurostat (NUTS level 2 regions). The sample inclu-
des 110 regions.7 The regression is estimated as a pooled panel of five-year averages, with 
or without fixed region and time effects, but also with random effects in some specifi-
cations to test the robustness of the results. The estimation period is from 1980 to 2000.8
6 Future research could add Denmark, Norway and Finland in this sample, especially as these are countries with 
relatively centralized wage bargaining systems, but low regional unemployment variation. 
7 Eurostat includes 151 NUTS 2 level regions for the countries in the sample, but the sample falls to 110 regions 
because of missing observations.
8 The data were obtained from Eurostat, various issues up to 2004. More recent observations have become avail-
able since then, showing that regional unemployment disparities have declined in most of Europe, including in Italy, 
together with an overall fall in unemployment. However, structural breaks seem to have been introduced in the more 






















Australia 80 80 80 48 40 25 4.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 4.5 4.0 2.0 2.0
Austria 95 95 95 57 47 37 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.0
Belgium 90 90 90 54 54 56 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5
Canada 37 38 32 35 33 28 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Denmark 70 70 80 79 75 74 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 4.0
Finland 90 90 90 69 72 76 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
France 80 90 90 18 10 10 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Germany 80 80 68 35 31 25 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Italy 80 80 80 50 39 35 3.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.5 2.0 3.0 4.0
Japan 25 20 15 31 25 22 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Netherland 70 70 80 35 25 23 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.0
New Zealand 60 60 25 69 51 23 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0 4.0 4.0 1.0 1.0
Norway 70 70 70 58 59 54 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Portugal 70 70 80 61 32 24 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0
Spain 60 70 80 7 11 15 4.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 4.0 3.5 3.0 3.0
Sweden 80 80 90 80 80 79 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.0
Switzerland 50 50 40 31 24 18 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
UK 70 40 30 51 39 31 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
United States 26 18 14 22 15 13 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Source: OECD (1997 and 2004)
80
A. Vamvakidis: Regional Wage Differentiation and Wage Bargaining Systems in the European Union
Financial Theory and Practice 33 (1) 73-87 (2009)
The dependent variable is the difference between the wage in a region and the wage 
in the country of this region, measured as the absolute value of 1 minus the ratio of each 
region’s wage with the national wage (absolute values are taken because the estimation 
attempts to find the determinants of regional wage differentials regardless if they are po-
sitive or negative). The wage rate is defined as total employment compensation, which 
includes nonwage compensation in cash, such as bonuses and other wage supplements in 
cash. The independent variables include: the lagged regional labor productivity differen-
tial compared with the labor productivity in the respective country, the lagged regional 
unemployment differential compared with the unemployment rate in the respective co-
untry (both calculated using the same formula as for the regional wage differential), and 
the OECD index of coordination of the wage bargaining system in each country (this is 
the same for each region within a country). The regional productivity and unemployment 
differentials are included with one lag to address causality concerns.  
The results in Table 4 suggest that coordination in wage bargaining and regional 
wage dispersion seem to be linked. The panel is estimated first as a pool and then with 
fixed region effects, with random region effects and with fixed region and time effects. 
According to the Hausman test, the specification should include fixed effects as oppo-
sed to random effects. Also, both region and time effects are statistically significant. The 
estimate of the coordination index is negative and statistically significant at the 10 per-
cent level in the pooled panel regression and at the 1 percent level in the regressions with 
fixed and random region effects. Although still with the right sign, the estimate is signi-
ficant only at the 15 percent level in the regression with both fixed region and time ef-
fects. Despite the fact that the level of significance is not always high, one could say that 
according to these results a high level of coordination seems to be linked to low regional 
wage differentiation. This relationship seems to be linear, as the square of the coordina-
tion index does not have a statistically significant estimate.9 The estimate of the unem-
ployment differential is positive, as would be expected, but not always statistically signi-
ficant. The estimate of the productivity differential is also positive and statistically signi-
ficant but in the regression with the fixed region effects, in which, although significant, 
has the wrong sign. The specification with fixed effects explains up to 66 percent of the 
variation in regional wages.10 
Institutions are often assumed to be exogenous, but labor market institutions do chan-
ge over time. Although the change of labor market institutions is usually slow, some ca-
usality concerns are justified. Indeed, the coordination index includes 17 changes during 
the period considered, 10 of which are towards less coordination. Furthermore, it could be 
the case that countries without large regional wage differentials adopt a centralized wage 
bargaining system, rather than the other way around. Including lags and fixed effects in 
recent wage series in some countries. Future research could address the empirical problems that could result from 
such breaks and extend the sample to more recent years. 
9 The results from the specification that includes the square of the coordination index are available from the 
author. 
10 We also tried to test whether the results were affected when some form of wage leadership was introduced into 
the empirical model (as in Demertzis, Hallett and Schermer, 2008). This test excluded Germany from the left-hand-
side of the regression and added Germany’s wages on the right-hand-side. The results remained robust. 
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the specification addresses some of these concerns. In addition, estimation with instru-
mental variables could further test the robustness of the results.
Results from an estimation with instrumental variables suggest an even stronger link 
between coordination in wage bargaining and regional wage dispersion. The instruments 
include the lagged values of the coordination and centralization indices. The estimates of 
the coordination index in Table 5 are now statistically significant at the 1 percent level, 
even when both fixed region and time effects are included in the specification.11 
Results from regressions with interaction terms suggest that the impact of coordina-
tion in wage bargaining on regional wage differentiation depends on productivity diffe-
rentials, but not on unemployment differentials. The results in Table 6 show that the esti-
mate of the coordination index remains positive and statistically significant at least at the 
10 percent level when an interaction term with unemployment differentials is included. In 
contrast, the interaction term has the wrong sign and is statistically insignificant. Howe-
ver, when an interaction term with the productivity differentials is included, the estima-
te of the coordination index loses its significance. In contrast, the interaction term is ne-
gative and statistically insignificant at least at the 10 percent level. Therefore, countries 
with less coordinated wage bargaining systems seem to bring wage dispersion closer to 
productivity dispersion.
Using Italy as an example – the country with the highest regional unemployment dis-
parities in the sample, the second lowest regional wage variation in the euro area, and a 
11 As the Hausman tests supports the estimation with fixed effects, what follows does not report results for the 
estimation with random effects. 
Table 4 Regional Wage Differentiation and Wage Bargaining in the EU, 1980–2000











0.002 0.109*** 0.032 0.090**
(0.092) (2.952) (1.574) (2.391)
Lagged productivity
differential
0.472*** -0.394*** 0.306*** -0.326***
(8.346) (-3.425) (5.440) (2.894)
Index of coordination in 
wage bargaining
-0.012* -0.026*** -0.016*** -0.014
(-1.834) (-2.905) (-2.601) (-1.465)
Adj. R-squared 0.25 0.63 0.11 0.66
Note: The sample includes 110 regions from the following countries: Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. The definition of the regions follows 
the Eurostat NUTS 2 level. The data are five-year averages for the period 1980 to 2000. The dependent 
variable is the difference between the wage in a region and the wage in the country of this region, mea-
sured as the absolute value of 1 minus the ratio of the wage in a region with the national wage. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 5  Regional Wage Differentiation and Wage Bargaining in the EU, Estimation 
with Instrumental Variables, 1980-2000
Fixed region 
effects








Index of coordination in wage bargaining
-0.044*** -0.032***
(-4.193) (-2.967)
Adj. R-squared 0.62 0.65
Note: The sample includes 110 regions from the following countries: Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. The definition of the regions follows 
the Eurostat NUTS 2 level. The data are five-year averages for the period 1980 to 2000. The depen-
dent variable is the difference between the wage in a region and the wage in the country of this region, 
measured as the absolute value of 1 minus the ratio of the wage in a region with the national wage. The 
instruments include the lagged values of the coordination and centralization indices. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively
Table 6  Regional Wage Differentiation and Wage Bargaining in the EU, Estimation 















0.021 -0.015 0.116*** 0.097**
(0.228) (-0.171) (3.179) (2.580)
Lagged productivity differential
-0.387*** -0.316*** 0.419 0.327
(-3.358) (-2.806) (1.018) (0.821)
Index of coordination in wage bargaining
-0.036*** -0.026* -0.003 0.004
(-2.758) (-1.970) (-0.180) (0.298)
(Index of coordination in wage bargaining) 
x (Lagged unemployment differential)
0.028 0.033
(1.057) (1.312)




Adj. R-squared 0.63 0.66 0.64 0.67
Note: The sample includes 110 regions from the following countries: Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. The definition of the regions follows 
the Eurostat NUTS 2 level. The data are five-year averages for the period 1980 to 2000. The dependent 
variable is the difference between the wage in a region and the wage in the country of this region, mea-
sured as the absolute value of 1 minus the ratio of the wage in a region with the national wage. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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centralized and coordinated wage bargaining system – the results imply that regional wage 
differentials are likely to increase if a more decentralized wage bargaining system was 
adopted. If Italy’s coordination index was to decline from its current value of 4 to 3.3, or 
by 0.7, which is the one standard deviation of the change in the coordination index in the 
sample, regional wage differences would increase by a median of between 9 to 20 per-
cent, depending on the specification and keeping everything else constant. The estimated 
impact is larger for regions with wages that are closer to the national wage and with pro-
ductivity rates that are further from the national average. 
B Evidence from wage curves: Germany versus Italy
This section discusses whether estimates from wage curves depend on coordination 
in wage bargaining, using regional data for Germany and Italy. The results suggest an 
increasing responsiveness of wages to unemployment over time in Germany, despite no 
change in wage bargaining coordination from a high level, but show no trend in the res-
ponsiveness of wages to productivity. For Italy, there is some evidence that the recent in-
crease in coordination in wage negotiations may have decreased the responsiveness of 
wages to productivity, but there seems to be no impact from earlier changes in coordina-
tion. Comparing the two countries, as Italy moved towards more coordination in wage ne-
gotiations, as was the case in Germany, the estimated elasticities of wages in Italy came 
closer to those in Germany. 
Germany and Italy were selected from the sample of EU countries as two economi-
es with relatively large regional disparities. Moreover, they allow comparisons between 
a country with no change in the wage bargaining process (Germany) and a country with a 
number of changes (Italy).12 Germany’s index for coordination in wage negotiations was 
equal to 4 during the whole sample period, suggesting a high level of coordination (Table 
3). Italy’s coordination index changed from 2 during the second half of the 1970s to 3.5 
in the early 1980s, then back to 2 in the late 1980s, to 3 in the early 1990s, and to 4 in the 
late 1990s. Therefore, Italy moved from an intermediate level of coordination in wage 
bargaining to a more coordinated process, then back to an intermediate level of coordina-
tion, and then to a very coordinated process.
The estimates are from panel regressions, including regions for each country, fo-
llowing Iara and Traistaru (2004). The sample includes 16 regions for Germany and 19 
regions for Italy. The data are annual observations, during 1980-2000. The dependent va-
riable is the log of the real wage rate in each region (nominal wages are deflated by the 
CPI index). The independent variables comprise the log of the unemployment rate and 
the log labor productivity rate in each region. The regressions also include region fixed 
effects. The elasticities for unemployment and productivity are estimated separately for 
each 5-year period, to test whether they depend on the value of the coordination index in 
each period (as shown in Table 3). The results are presented in Table 7.
The results for Germany are mixed (first column in Table 7), suggesting that the res-
ponsiveness of wages to unemployment increased over time, but showing no clear trend 
12 In addition, Germany and Italy are the two countries with the most observations available for annual data in 
the sample.
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for the estimates of productivity. As expected, the estimates are negative for the unem-
ployment rate and positive for the productivity rate. The estimates for unemployment be-
come more negative over time. The Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the coeffi-
cients of unemployment are equal in all subperiods at the 1 percent level. The change in 
the coefficient of unemployment may be driven by overall labor market reforms, as the 
coordination index remained constant during this period. In contrast, although the estima-
te for productivity increases after the early 1980s, it remains statistically the same during 
the rest of the period (the Wald tests cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are 
equal after the mid-1980s). 
The results for Italy suggest a fall in the responsiveness of wages to productivity du-
ring the last subperiod, when there was high coordination in wage negotiations, but no 
clear trend is found for earlier periods. Table 7 includes results from two specifications for 
Italy, one with estimates for all subperiods (third column) and one with separate estimates 
for the subperiod 1985-89, in which the coordination index had its lowest value (equal to 
2) and for the subperiod 1995-00, in which the coordination index had its highest value 





















1995-2000 0.287*** 0.299*** -0.033***
(2.764) (4.125) (-4.793)
Adj. R-squared 0.92 0.82 0.78
Note: Panel regressions of annual data in logs, with fixed region effects, for the period 1980-2000. 
The sample includes 16 regions for Germany and 19 regions for Italy. The definition of the regions follows 
the Eurostat NUTS 2 level. The dependent variable is the log real wage rate of each region
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(equal to 4). The estimates show no clear trend in the responsiveness of wages to unem-
ployment, although it starts relatively high and ends up lower.13 However, the results su-
ggest that the responsiveness of wages to productivity was significantly smaller in the last 
subperiod, when coordination in wage negotiations was high. 
Comparing the two countries, the results suggest that the estimated elasticities were 
converging during the sample period. Italy’s wage elasticities were much higher than 
Germany’s in the beginning. By the end of the sample period, the estimated elasticities 
were closer, which was consistent with both countries having the same level of coordi-
nation in wage negotiations. 
IV Conclusions
The theoretical literature has argued that a centralized and coordinated wage bar-
gaining system may cause low regional wage differentiation and high regional unem-
ployment differentials. Empirical evidence in this paper for EU regions for the period 
1980-2000 suggests that, indeed, highly coordinated wage bargaining systems and low 
regional wage differentiation are linked: countries with less coordinated wage bargaining 
systems have higher regional wage differentials, after controlling for regional producti-
vity and unemployment differences. The results are robust to estimation with fixed ef-
fects and to estimation with instrumental variables, suggesting that it is the wage barga-
ining system that influences regional wage differentiation rather than the other way aro-
und. Furthermore, results from wage curves estimated for panels of regions in Germany 
and Italy suggest some links between the estimated elasticities and the level of coordina-
tion in wage bargaining.
The empirical evidence suggests that a more decentralized wage bargaining system 
could increase regional wage differentiation in countries with high regional productivity 
differentials, although not necessarily the country’s labor market performance. Using the 
case of Italy as an example, the economic significance of the results is shown to be large. 
However, the discussion of the literature suggests that compression of regional wage dis-
tribution brought by more centralized and coordinated wage bargaining may be partly co-
untered by internalization of possible effects on employment. Although the empirical re-
sults on the latter effect are not robust, labor market reforms should take both forces into 
account in order to achieve the best possible trade off between overall labor market per-
formance and regional disparities. 
The results should be treated as only suggestive, since the sample of countries is small 
and with a relatively small variation in their wage bargaining characteristics (most countri-
es in Europe have relatively centralized and coordinated wage bargaining systems). Furt-
hermore, the statistical significance of the results is relatively low in some specifications, 
although this is not the case in the estimation with instrumental variables. The work on 
wage bargaining indices is still in progress and existing indices may suffer from measu-
rement errors. Reforms to the bargaining structure could coincide with other labor market 
13 The estimated unemployment elasticities for Italy are somewhat lower than the ones in Sans de Galena and 
Turenne (2005). The inclusion of labor productivity in the present specification may explain the difference. 
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reforms, suggesting that the results may capture such broad reforms, rather than reforms 
specific to wage negotiations. To further investigate the robustness of the results, it would 
be useful for future work to increase the country sample as more data become available, to 
improve the indices of wage bargaining, and to investigate the role of other determinants 
of regional wage differentials in addition to the ones controlled for in this paper.
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